BP's Gulf of Mexico PR, One Year Later | Center for Media and Democracy
The U.S. Department of the Interior and the Coast Guard recently released their joint report (pdf) on the Deepwater Horizon disaster and it has restarted the blame game. The report concluded all three corporate participants in the calamity -- BP, Transocean Ltd. and Halliburton -- were at fault. Furthermore, it concluded all three companies violated federal laws and safety regulations by "failing to take necessary precautions to keep the Macondo well under control at all times." Additionally it found all three companies were "jointly and severely liable for the failure to comply with all applicable regulations." Meaning all three companies are mutually responsible for the accident, and each can be held singly responsible for the entire debacle. The report parsed blame among the companies for sloppy materials and workmanship, inadequate training, failure to properly assess risk and conduct proper testing, failure to abide by stop-work policies after multiple anomalies were discovered, and so on.
BP agreed with the report's "core conclusion" that the accident was the result of "multiple causes, involving multiple parties, including Transocean and Halliburton." BP encouraged the other companies to "acknowledge their roles in the accident" and urged them to make changes to prevent similar accidents in the future. The report, though, held BP "ultimately responsible for conducting operations at Macondo in a way that ensured the safety and protection of personnel, equipment, natural resources and the environment."
The U.S. Department of the Interior and the Coast Guard recently released their joint report (pdf) on the Deepwater Horizon disaster and it has restarted the blame game. The report concluded all three corporate participants in the calamity -- BP, Transocean Ltd. and Halliburton -- were at fault. Furthermore, it concluded all three companies violated federal laws and safety regulations by "failing to take necessary precautions to keep the Macondo well under control at all times." Additionally it found all three companies were "jointly and severely liable for the failure to comply with all applicable regulations." Meaning all three companies are mutually responsible for the accident, and each can be held singly responsible for the entire debacle. The report parsed blame among the companies for sloppy materials and workmanship, inadequate training, failure to properly assess risk and conduct proper testing, failure to abide by stop-work policies after multiple anomalies were discovered, and so on.
BP agreed with the report's "core conclusion" that the accident was the result of "multiple causes, involving multiple parties, including Transocean and Halliburton." BP encouraged the other companies to "acknowledge their roles in the accident" and urged them to make changes to prevent similar accidents in the future. The report, though, held BP "ultimately responsible for conducting operations at Macondo in a way that ensured the safety and protection of personnel, equipment, natural resources and the environment."
BP Messages and Actions are Far From Aligned
A year after the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico BP is publicly trying to look like it accepts responsibility for the disaster. However, behind the scenes the company is quietly engaging in activities that cast doubt on its sincerity and appearance of contrition. For example, BP is one of the highest-level corporate funders of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a corporate bill mill that gives companies a hand in crafting business-friendly legislation and resolutions. ALEC helps energy companies fight restrictions on offshore drilling and pushes a deregulatory agenda at every turn.
Contrary to What BP Wants the Public to Believe, All is Not Well in the Gulf
The PR tactics seem to fit BP's strategic "corporate responsibility" needs at this point. But while BP's website shows pleasing photos of clean sea turtles and throngs of happy beachgoers cavorting in the water along the Gulf of Mexico seashore, reports about the status of the Gulf one year later show marshes still saturated with oil, even after billions of dollars have been spent on cleaning. One marsh that BP pronounced particularly clean showed oil oozing out of the mud just below the water's surface when journalists stepped in it, and it still reeked. BP has also refused to help restore Louisiana's oyster beds, saying "BP is not obligated to pay for such damage -- because it was not caused by the oil spill." The damage, BP claims, was caused by a release of fresh water, but the fresh water was only released because of the oil disaster, to try and flush out the wetlands. Dolphins and dead endangered sea turtles are washing up on Gulf shorelines at 10 to 20 times the normal numbers.
BP is hoping that Americans will simply forget about the 2010 Gulf disaster, absorb their corporate PR strategies unquestioningly, and won't look any deeper than the "all's fine" facade they're striving to spin. Is this the best they can do in a case like this?>
The BP homepage shows their latest business success a $15.95 billion dollar project in the North Sea.
Their Gulf Recovery section mentions $500 million earmarked for study to monitor long-term effects of the spill. Isn't that generous of them?
BP is hoping that Americans will simply forget about the 2010 Gulf disaster, absorb their corporate PR strategies unquestioningly, and won't look any deeper than the "all's fine" facade they're striving to spin. Is this the best they can do in a case like this?>
Their Gulf Recovery section mentions $500 million earmarked for study to monitor long-term effects of the spill. Isn't that generous of them?
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